Physicians are trusted to act in patients’ best interests. Yet financial incentives mean they may provide more (or less) care than patients would choose themselves.
How do simple models help us understand when these incentives lead to overuse, underuse, or efficient care?
For the next couple of classes, we’re going to focus on the role of financial incentives. We’ll turn to the role of information barriers/heterogeneities at the end of this module
Well…yes!. Let’s talk about one paper in particular:
Denote the quantity of care consumed by \(x\), and denote by \(B(x)\) the function that determines the benefit of care to the patient. Assume that the patient must pay the full price of care, \(px\), so that their net benefit is \(NB = B(x) − px\). Further assume that the physician can choose both \(x\) and \(p\).
Depiction of physician agency
Assume \(B(x)=8x^{1/2}\), \(NB^{0}=2\), and \(c=1\):
If the patient could choose, they would maximize \(NB(x)=B(x)-px\).
Condition: \(4x^{-1/2} = p\), which yields \(x = (32/15)^{2} \approx 4.5\) at \(p=15/8\).
\[B(x) - \bar{p}x = NB^{0}\]
Why? This is a corner solution — derivatives don’t apply in the same way.
Assume \(B(x)=4x^{1/2}\), \(NB^{0}=0\), anc \(c=1\). Further assume that prices are fixed administratively at, \(\bar{p}=2\). Note that, in this case, we work only off of the patient’s net benefit constraint.
An increase in the administratively set price leads to a decrease in quantity of services provided. And vice versa, a reduction in price leads to an increase in quantity provided. Why?
\[\begin{align*} b(x)\frac{\mathrm{d}x}{\mathrm{d}p} - x - p\frac{\mathrm{d}x}{\mathrm{d}p} &= 0 \\ \frac{\mathrm{d}x}{\mathrm{d}p} = \frac{-x}{p-b(x)} &< 0. \end{align*}\]