Bargaining

Ian McCarthy | Emory University

Nash Bargaining

Basics

We model this bargaining problem as a “Nash bargaining” problem.

  • Two people are faced with a negotiation
  • If they agree, each gets payoffs \(u_{1}\) \(u_{2}\), respectively
  • If they disagree, each gets some other payoff, \(t_{1}\) and \(t_{2}\), with \(u_{1} > t_{1}\) and \(u_{2} > t_{2}\)
  • Nash showed that the solution is \(\max (u_{1}- t_{1})(u_{2} - t_{2})\)

Understanding the outside option

Key part of understanding effect on price is to understand the “outside option”. What does this mean?

  • Profit to the hospital or insurer if a negotiation “breaks down”
  • What is the outside option to an insurer if they are in a monopoly hospital market?

In-class problem (Nash bargaining)

Assume that two agents are negotiating over how best to divide their quantity of good x, which is normalized to 1. If the players reach an agreement, player 1 receives utility \(u_{1} = x\), and player 2 receives utility \(u_{2} = (1-x)\). If the players do not reach an agreement, player 1 receives a payoff of \(t1 = 0\), and player 2 receives payoff \(t_{2} = a > 0\).

  1. Find the Nash bargaining solution to this game.
  2. Explain how this solution varies with \(a\).

Bargaining in Healthcare

Basic Idea

  • Extend Nash bargaining framework to consider a hospital-insurer negotiation

  • Two-stage bargaining process:

    1. Hospitals and insurers negotiate the terms of their agreement
    2. Individuals receive health draws which dictate their health care needs

Solve the problem working backward, finding patient choice probabilities based on prices, and then solving for prices. Take as given the employer-insurer relationship, avoiding concerns regarding employers changing insurers or patients choosing different health care plans.

Setup

  • Denote consumers by \(i\), insurance companies by \(m\), hospitals by \(j\), and diseases by \(d\)
  • Denote by \(f_{mid}\) the probability that patient \(i\) enrolled in MCO \(m\) has disease \(d\) (\(d=0\) implies no disease)
  • Denote by \(w_{d}\) the weights reflecting the relative intensity of resource use for illness \(d\), with \(w_{0}\) normalized to 0
  • Insurer and hospital negotiate a base price, to which all other payments are adjusted using the relative weight
  • Price paid for a given treatment is \(p_{mj} \times w_{d}\).

Patients

  • Coinsurance rate, denoted \(c_{mit}\)
  • Patient with disease \(d\) chooses the hospital \(j\) in their network (\(N_{m}\)) that maximizes their utility
  • Patient utility is given by: \[u_{mijd} = \beta x_{mijd} - \alpha c_{mid} w_{d} p_{mj} + e_{mij}\]
  • \(x_{mijd}\) denotes a vector of hospital and patient characteristics, and \(e_{mij}\) is an iid error term assumed to follow a Type I extreme value distribution

Patients

  • Probability of choosing hospital \(j\) is given by \[s_{mijd}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m}) = \frac{\exp (\beta x_{mijd} - \alpha c_{mid} w_{d} p_{mj})}{\sum_{k}\exp (\beta x_{mikd} - \alpha c_{mid} w_{d} p_{mk})},\] where \(\sum_{k}\) denotes the sum over all \(k\) hospitals in the patient’s network as well as their outside option.
  • Expected number of patients admitted to hospital \(j\), weighted by the relative intensity of resource use, is \[q_{mj}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m}) = \sum_{i=1}^{I_{m}} \sum_{d=1}^{D} f_{mid} w_{d} s_{mijd}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m}).\]

Patients

  • Closed form expression for consumer surplus, \[W_{m}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m})=\frac{1}{\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{I_{m}} \sum_{d=1}^{D} f_{mid} \ln \left( \sum_{k}\exp (\beta x_{mikd} - \alpha c_{mid} w_{d} p_{mk}) \right)\]
  • Difference between \(W_{m}\) with and without hospital \(j\) in the patient’s network, \(W_{m}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m}) - W_{m}(N_{m,-j},\vec{p}_{m})\), then serves as an estimate of the patient’s willingness to pay for hospital \(j\)

Insurers

  • Expected cost to the MCO for a given hospital and associated prices, \[TC_{m}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m})=\sum_{i=1}^{I_{m}} \sum_{d=1}^{D} (1 - c_{mid}) \times \sum_{j\in N_{m}} p_{mj} f_{mid} s_{mijd}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m})\]
  • Value for the MCO is \[V_{m}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m}) = \tau W_{m}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m}) - TC_{m}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m}),\] where \(\tau\) is the relative weight placed on employee welfare
  • Net value that MCO \(m\) receives from including system \(s\) in its network is then \(V_{m}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m})-V_{m}(N_{m,-j},\vec{p}_{m})\).

Hospitals

  • Hospital \(j\)’s marginal cost for services provided to patients in MCO \(m\) is given by \[mc_{mj}=\gamma \nu_{mj} + \varepsilon_{mj},\] where \(\nu_{mj}\) denotes a set of cost shifters, \(\gamma\) are parameters to estimate, and \(\varepsilon\) is an error term
  • Profit for hospital \(j\) for a given set of MCO contracts (denoted \(M_{s}\)), is \[\pi_{s}\left(M_{s},\{\vec{p}_{m}\}_{m\in M_{s}},\{N_{m} \}_{m\in M_{s}} \right)=\sum_{m\in M_{s}} \sum_{j \in J_{s}} q_{mj}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m}) \left[p_{mj} - mc_{mj} \right]\]
  • Net value that system \(s\) receives from including MCO \(m\) in its network is \[\sum_{j \in J_{s}} q_{mj}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m}) \left[p_{mj} - mc_{mj} \right].\]

Nash Bargaining Solution

Nash bargaining solution is the choice of prices maximizing exponentiated product of the net value from agreement:

\[\begin{align*} NB^{m,s} \left(p_{mj, j\in J_{s}} | \vec{p}_{m,-s}\right) &= \left(\sum_{j\in J_{s}}q_{mj}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m}) \left[p_{mj} - mc_{mj} \right]\right)^{b_{s(m)}} \\ & \times \left(V_{m}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m})-V_{m}(N_{m,-j},\vec{p}_{m})\right)^{b_{m(s)}}, \end{align*}\] where \(b_{s(m)}\) is the bargaining weight of system \(s\) when facing MCO \(m\), \(b_{m(s)}\) is the bargaining weight of MCO \(m\) when facing system \(s\), and \(\vec{p}_{m,-s}\) is the vector of prices for MCO \(m\) and hospitals in systems other than \(s\). We can normalize bargaining weight such that \(b_{s(m)} + b_{m(s)} = 1\).

Nash Bargaining Solution

Note that taking the natural log of the objective does not change the maximum, since the natural log is a ``monotonic transformation.’’ In other words, the log will change the value of some function \(f(x)\), but it will not change the order, so that if \(f(x_{1})>f(x_{2})\), it follows that \(\ln (f(x_{1})) > \ln (f(x_{2}))\).

The resulting first order condition yields: \[\begin{align*} \frac{d \ln (NB^{m,s})}{p_{mj}} &= b_{s(m)} \frac{d q_{mj} + \sum_{k\in J_{s}} \frac{d q_{mk}}{d p_{mj}} \left[p_{mk}-mc_{mk}\right]}{\sum_{k\in J_{s}} q_{mk}\left[p_{mk}-mc_{mk}\right]} + b_{m(s)} \frac{\frac{d V_{m}}{d p_{mj}}}{V_{m}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m})-V_{m}(N_{m,-j},\vec{p}_{m})} \\ &= 0 \end{align*}\]

Nash Bargaining Solution

  • Rearrange this equation to write: \[q_{mj} + \sum_{k\in J_{s}} \frac{d q_{mk}}{d p_{mj}} \left[p_{mk}-mc_{mk}\right] = -\frac{b_{m(s)}}{b_{s(m)}} \frac{\frac{d V_{m}}{d p_{mj}} \sum_{k\in J_{s}} q_{mk}\left[p_{mk}-mc_{mk}\right]}{V_{m}(N_{m},\vec{p}_{m})-V_{m}(N_{m,-j},\vec{p}_{m})}\]

  • By assumption, the first order conditions are separable across insurers. Combining all first order conditions therefore yields the following system of equations: \[q + \omega (p-mc) = -\lambda (p-mc),\] where \(\omega\) and \(\lambda\) are each \(J_{s} \times J_{s}\) matrices, while \(q\) and \(p-mc\) are \(J_{s} \times 1\) vectors

  • We can then solve for prices: \[p = mc - (\omega + \lambda)^{-1} q\]

Insurer Steering

“Reasonable assumptions” such that \[\frac{d V_{m}}{d p_{mj}}=-q_{mj}-\alpha \sum_{i}\sum_{d}\gamma_{id}c_{id}(1-c_{id}) \left(\sum_{k\in N_{m}} p_{mk}s_{ikd} - p_{mj}\right),\] where \(\gamma_{id}\) includes several terms including disease weights and probability of disease

  • \(c_{id}\times (1-c_{id})\) captures role of insurer coinsurance rates in steering patients
    • If \(p_{mj}\) is high relative to the weighted average price of other hospitals, then \(\frac{d V_{m}}{d p_{mj}}\) is less negative due to the term in parenthesis, and thus it is optimal (in the sense of maximizing joint surplus) to allow \(p_{mj}\) to increase so as to channel customers to the low price hospital.
    • In the extreme cases, at \(c_{id}=1\) the insurer wouldn’t care about negotiating price with physicians since all of the extra cost is borne by patients. Conversely, at \(c_{id}=0\) the term in parenthesis is again irrelevant as the patients do not switch to lower price hospitals.

Bargaining and Prices

Consider the special case of a single-hospital system, \[p_{mj} - mc_{mj} = -q_{mj} \left(\frac{d q_{mj}}{d p_{mj}} + q_{mj} \times \frac{b_{m(j)}}{b_{j(m)}} \times \frac{\frac{d V_{m}}{d p_{mj}}}{\triangle V_{m}} \right)^{-1}\]

  • The term \(\triangle V_{m}\) is positive by construction. With some work, we can find that \(\frac{d V_{m}}{d p_{mj}}<0\) under most conditions. This means that the presence of bargaining tends to increase the ``effective’’ price sensitivity and reduce hospital margins relative to standard pricing conditions.
  • However, note that this result does not always hold. In cases where some hospitals are particularly higher priced than others, then the insurer may allow a given hospital to increase its margins (relative to standard pricing conditions) so as to steer patients away from the very high priced hospital.